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Abstract
We argue that the vulnerability of model parameters is of crucial value to the study
of model robustness and generalization but little research has been devoted to
understanding this matter. In this work, we propose an indicator to measure the
robustness of neural network parameters by exploiting their vulnerability via pa-
rameter corruption. The proposed indicator describes the maximum loss variation
in the non-trivial worst-case scenario under parameter corruption. For practical
purposes, we give a gradient-based estimation, which is far more effective than
random corruption trials that can hardly induce the worst accuracy degradation.
Equipped with theoretical support and empirical validation, we are able to sys-
tematically investigate the robustness of different model parameters and reveal
vulnerability of deep neural networks that has been rarely paid attention to before.
Moreover, we can enhance the models accordingly with the proposed adversarial
corruption-resistant training, which not only improves the parameter robustness
but also translates into accuracy elevation.
1 Introduction
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Figure 1: Parameter corruptions with
ResNet-34 on ImageNet. It shows that
deep neural networks are robust to ran-
dom corruptions, but the accuracy can
drop significantly in the worst case sug-
gested by the gradient-based method.
The accuracy is measured on the devel-
opment set.
Despite the promising performance of Deep neural net-
works (DNNs), research has discovered that DNNs are
vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e., simple perturba-
tions to input data can mislead models [14, 18, 21]. These
findings concern vulnerability of DNNs against input data.
However, the vulnerability of DNNs does not only exhibit
in input data. As functions of both input data and model
parameters, the parameters of neural networks are a source
of vulnerability of equal importance. Especially, advances
in hardware neural networks [25, 1, 30, 34, 2] also call
for study in parameter vulnerability because of hardware
deterioration and background noise, which can be seen as
parameter corruption. More importantly, study on param-
eter vulnerability can deepen our understanding of various
mechanisms in neural networks, inspiring innovation in
architecture design and training paradigm.
To probe the vulnerability of neural network parameters
and evaluate the parameter robustness, we propose an in-
dicator that measures the maximum loss change caused by small perturbations on model parameters in
the non-trivial worst-cased scenario. The perturbations can be seen as artificial parameter corruptions.
We give an infinitesimal gradient-based estimation of the indicator that is efficient for practical
∗Equally contributed.
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purposes compared with random corruption trials, which can hardly induce optimal loss degradation.
Our theoretical and empirical results both validate the effectiveness of the proposed gradient-based
method. As shown in Figure 1, model parameters are generally resistant to random corruptions but
the worst outlook can be quite bleak suggested by the gradient-based corruption result.
x0 x1
0 = [x0 , x0 + ] 1 = [x1 , x1 + ]
A
B
y = f(x)
Figure 2: In this illustration of the loss
function, traditional optimizer prefers B
rather than A, because B has the lower
loss. However, parameters at point B
are more vulnerable to parameter cor-
ruption, as maxx∈I0(f(x) − f(x0)) <
maxx∈I1(f(x) − f(x1)). Base on our
experiments, we argue that parameters
that are resistant to corruption, e.g., at
point A, can embody potentially better
robustness and generalization.
Intuitively, the indicator shows the maximum altitude as-
cent within a certain distance of the current parameter on
the loss surface, as illustrated conceptually in Figure 2.
The traditional learning algorithms focus on obtaining
lower loss, which means generally the parameters at point
B are preferred. However, the local geometry of the land-
scape also indicates the generalization performance of
the learning algorithm [17, 4]. The parameters at point B
demonstrate critical vulnerability to parameter corruptions,
while the parameters at point A are a better choice since
larger perturbations are required to render significant loss
change. It is also observed in our experiments that the pa-
rameters at point A have better generalization performance
as a result of corruption-resistance.
Equipped with the proposed indicator, we are able to sys-
tematically analyze the parameter robustness and probe
the vulnerability of different components in a deep neu-
ral network via observing the accuracy degradation after
applying corruptions to its parameters. Furthermore, the
comparisons between the gradient-based and the random
corruption for estimating the indicator suggest that the
neighborhood of the learned parameters on the loss surface is generally flattish except for certain
steep directions. If we can push the parameters away from the steep directions, the robustness
of the parameters can be improved significantly. Therefore, we propose to conduct adversarial
corruption-resistant training that incorporates virtual parameter corruptions to find parameters with-
out steep directions in the neighborhood. Experimental results show that the proposed method not
only improves the parameter robustness of deep neural networks but also elevates their accuracy in
application tasks.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• To understand the parameter vulnerability of deep neural networks, which is fundamentally
related to model robustness and generalization, we propose an indicator that measures the
maximum loss change if small perturbations are applied on model parameters, i.e., parameter
corruptions. The proposed gradient-based estimation is far more effective in exposing the
parameter vulnerability than random corruption trials, validated by both theoretical and
empirical results.
• The indicator is used to probe the vulnerability of different kinds of parameters with diverse
structural characteristics in a trained neural network. Through systematic analyses of
representative architecture across benchmark datasets, we summarize divergent vulnerability
of neural network parameters, especially bringing attention to normalization layers.
• To improve the robustness of the models with respect to parameters, we propose to enhance
the training of deep neural networks by taking the parameter vulnerability into account and
introduce the adversarial corruption-resistant training that can improve the accuracy and the
generalization performance of deep neural networks.
2 Parameter Corruption
In this section, we introduce the problem of parameter corruption and the proposed indicator. Then,
we describe the Monte-Carlo estimation and the gradient-based estimation of the indicator backed
with theoretical support.
Before delving into the specifics, we first introduce our notations. Let N denote a neural network,
w ∈ Rk denote a k-dimensional subspace of its parameter space, and L(w;D) denote the loss
2
function of N on the dataset D, regarding to the specific parameter subspace w. Taking a k-
dimensional subspace allows a more general analysis on a specific group of parameters.
To expose the vulnerability of model parameters, we propose to adopt the approach of parameter
corruption. To formally analyze its effect on neural networks and eliminate trivial corruption, we
formulate the parameter corruption as a small perturbation a ∈ Rk to the parameter vector w. The
corrupted parameter vector becomes w + a. The small perturbation requirement is realized as a
constraint set of the parameter corruptions.
Definition 1 (Corruption Constraint). The corruption constraint is specified by the set
S = {a : ‖a‖p =  and ‖a‖0 ≤ n}, (1)
where ‖·‖0 denotes the number of non-zero elements in a vector and 1 ≤ n ≤ k denotes the maximum
number of corrupted parameters.  is a small positive real number and ‖ · ‖p denotes the Lp-norm
where p ≥ 1 such that ‖ · ‖p is a valid distance in Euclidean geometry.
For example, a ∈ S = {a : ‖a‖2 =  and ‖a‖0 ≤ k} specifies that the corruption should be on a
k-dimensional sphere with a radius of  and no limit on the number of corrupted parameters.
Suppose ∆L(w,a;D) = L(w + a;D)−L(w;D) denotes the loss change. To evaluate the effect of
parameter corruption, it is most reasonable to consider the worst-case scenario and thus, we propose
the indicator as the maximum loss change under the corruption constraints. The optimal parameter
corruption is defined accordingly.
Definition 2 (Indicator and Optimal Parameter Corruption). The indicator ∆maxL(w, S,D) and the
optimal parameter corruption a∗ are defined as:
∆maxL(w, S,D) = max
a∈S
∆L(w,a,D), and a∗ = arg max
a∈S
∆L(w,a,D). (2)
Let g denote ∂L(w;D)/∂w and H denote the Hessian matrix; suppose ‖g‖2 = G > 0. Using the
second-order Taylor expansion, we estimate the loss change and the indicator:
∆L(w,a;D) = aTg + 1
2
aTHa + o(2) = f(a) + o(). (3)
Here, f(a) = aTg is a first-order estimation of ∆L(w,a;D) and meanwhile the inner product of the
parameter corruption a and the gradient g, based on which we maximize the alternative inner product
instead of initial loss function to estimate the indicator.
We provide and analyze two methods to understand the effect of parameter corruption, which
estimate the value of the indicator based on constructive, artificial, theoretical parameter corruptions.
Comparing the two methods, the random parameter corruption gives a Monte-Carlo estimation of
the indicator and the gradient-based parameter corruption gives an infinitesimal estimation that can
effectively capture the worst case. Please refer to Appendix for detailed proofs of propositions and
theorems.
2.1 Random Corruption
We first analyze the random case. As we know, randomly sampling a perturbation vector a does
not necessarily conform to the constraint set S and it is complex to generate corruption uniformly
distributed in S as the generation is determined by the shape of S and is not universal enough. In
order to eliminate the problem, we define the random parameter corruptions used in this estimation as
maximizing an alternative inner product aTr under the constraint, based on a random vector r instead
of the gradient g to ensure the randomness.
Definition 3 (Random Parameter Corruption and Monte-Carlo Estimation). Given a randomly
sampled vector r ∼ N(0, 1), a valid random corruption a˜ for a Monte-Carlo estimation of the
indicator in the constraint set S, which has a closed-form solution, is
a˜ = arg max
a∈S
aTr = 
(
sgn(h) |h|
1
p−1
‖|h| 1p−1 ‖p
)
(4)
where h = topn(r). The topn(v) function retains top-n magnitude of all |v| dimensions and set other
dimensions to 0, sgn(·) denotes the signum function, | · | denotes the point-wise absolute function,
and (·)α denotes the point-wise α-power function. The loss change with the random corruption is a
Monte-Carlo estimation of the indicator.
3
Algorithm 1 Random Corruption
Require: Parameter vector w ∈ Rk, set of corruption
constraints S
1: Sample r ∼ N(0, 1)
2: Solve the random corruption a˜ according to Eq.(4)
3: Update the parameter vector w← w + a˜
Algorithm 2 Gradient-Based Corruption
Require: Parameter vector w ∈ Rk, set of corruption
constraints S, loss function L and dataset D
1: Obtain the gradient g← ∂L(w;D)/∂w
2: Solve the corruption aˆ in Eq.(7) with S and g
3: Update the parameter vector w← w + aˆ
The procedure to derive the random corruption vector under the Monte-Carlo estimation of the
indicator is shown in Algorithm 1. The correctness and randomness of the resulting corruption vector
are assured and the theoretical results are given in Appendix. Without losing generality, we discuss
the characteristics of the loss change caused by random corruption under a representative corruption
constraint in Theorem 1. A detailed version of the theorem and the proof can be found in Appendix.
Theorem 1 (Distribution of Random Corruption). Given the constraint set S = {a : ‖a‖2 = }
and a generated random corruption a˜ by Eq. (4), which in turn obeys a uniform distribution on
‖a˜‖2 = . The first-order estimation of ∆maxL(w, S,D) and the expectation of the loss change
caused by random corruption is
∆maxL(w, S,D) = G+ o(), and E‖a˜‖2=[∆L(w, a˜;D)] = O
(
tr(H)
k
2
)
. (5)
Define η = |a˜Tg|/G, which is an estimation of |∆L(w,a˜,D)|/∆maxL(w,S,D), then η ∈ [0, 1] and the
probability density function pη(x) of η and the cumulative density P (η ≤ x) function of η are
pη(x) =
2Γ(k2 )√
piΓ(k−12 )
(1− x2) k−32 , and P (η ≤ x) = 2xF1(
1
2 ,
3−k
2 ;
3
2 ;x
2)
B(k−12 ,
1
2 )
, (6)
where k denotes the number of corrupted parameters and Γ(·), B(·, ·) and F1(·, ·; ·; ·) denote the
gamma function, beta function and hyper-geometric function, respectively.
Theorem 1 states that the expectation of loss change of random corruption is infinitesimal compared
to ∆maxL(w, S,D) when  → 0. In addition, it is unlikely for multiple random trials to induce
the optimal loss change corresponding to the indicator. For a deep neural network, the number of
parameters, which is the upper bound of k, can be considerably large. According to Eq.(6), η will
be concentrated near 0. Thus, theoretically, it is not generally possible for the random corruption to
cause substantial loss changes in this circumstance, making it ineffective in finding vulnerability.
2.2 Gradient-Based Corruption
To arrive at the optimal parameter corruption that renders a more accurate estimation of the proposed
indicator, we further propose a gradient-based method based on maximizing the first-order estimation
f(a) = aTg of the indicator.
Definition 4 (Gradient-Based Corruption and Estimation). Maximizing the first-order estimation
f(a) = aTg of the indicator, the gradient-based parameter corruption aˆ in S is
aˆ = arg max
a∈S
aTg = 
(
sgn(h) |h|
1
p−1
‖|h| 1p−1 ‖p
)
, and f(aˆ) = aˆTg = ‖h‖ p
p−1
, (7)
where h = topn(g), other notations are used similarly to Definition 3. The resultant corruption
vector leads to a gradient-based estimation of the indicator.
The procedure of the gradient-based method is summarized in Algorithm 2. The error bound of the
gradient-based estimation is described in Theorem 2. The proof and further analysis of computational
complexity are provided in Appendix.
Theorem 2 (Error Bound of the Gradient-Based Estimation). Suppose L(w;D) is convex and L-
smooth with respect to w in the subspace {w + a : a ∈ S}, where S = {a : ‖a‖p =  and ‖a‖0 ≤
n}.2 Suppose a∗ and aˆ are the optimal corruption and the gradient-based corruption in S respectively.
2Note that L is only required to be convex and L-smooth in a neighbourhood of w, instead of the entire Rk.
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‖g‖2 = G > 0. It is easy to verify that L(w+a∗;D) ≥ L(w + aˆ;D) > L(w;D) . It can be proved
that the loss change of the gradient-based corruption is the same order infinitesimal of that of the
optimal parameter corruption:
∆maxL(w, S;D)
∆L(w, aˆ;D) = 1 +O
(
Lnmax{1/2−2/p,1/p−1}
√
k
G
)
. (8)
Theorem 2 guarantees when perturbations to model parameters are small enough, the gradient-based
corruption can accurately estimate the indicator with small errors. In Eq. (8), the numerator is the
proposed indicator, which is the maximum loss change caused by parameter corruption, and the
denominator is the loss change with the parameter corruption generated by the gradient-based method.
As we can see, when the p-norm  of the corruption vector tends to zero, the term O(·) will also
tend to zero such that the ratio becomes one, meaning the gradient-based method is an infinitesimal
estimation of the indicator.
3 Experiments
We first empirically validate the effectiveness of the proposed gradient-based corruption compared to
random corruption. Then, it is applied to evaluate the robustness of neural network parameters by
scanning for vulnerability and counteract parameter corruption via adversarial training.
3.1 Experimental Settings
We use four widely-used tasks including benchmark datasets in CV and NLP and use diverse neural
network architecture. On the image classification task, the base model is ResNet-34 [16], the datasets
are CIFAR-10 [32] and ImageNet, and the evaluation metric is accuracy. On the machine translation
task, the base model is Transformer provided by fairseq [27], the dataset is German-English translation
dataset (De-En) [27, 28, 35], and the evaluation metric is BLEU score. On the language modeling
task, the base model is LSTM following [23, 24], the dataset is the English Penn TreeBank (PTB-LM)
[22], and the evaluation metric is Log Perplexity (Log PPL). On the dependency parsing task, the
base model is MLP following [5], the dataset is the English Penn TreeBank dependency parsing
(PTB-Parsing) [22], and the evaluation metric is Unlabeled Attachment Score (UAS). For the detailed
experimental setup, please refer to Appendix.
3.2 Empirical Validation of Gradient-Based Corruption
The comparative results between the gradient-based corruption and the random corruption are shown
in Figure 3 and Table 1. Figure 3 shows that parameter corruption under the corruption constraint can
result in substantial accuracy degradation for different sorts of neural networks and the gradient-based
parameter corruption requires smaller perturbation than the random parameter corruption. The
gradient-based corruption works for smaller corruption length and causes more damage at the same
corruption length. To conclude, the gradient-based corruption effectively defects model parameters
with minimal corruption length compared to the random corruption, thus being a viable and efficient
approach to find the parameter vulnerability.
3.3 Probing the Vulnerability of DNN Parameters
Here we use the indicator to probe the Vulnerability of DNN Parameters. We use the gradient-based
corruption on parameters from separated components and set n as the maximum number of the
corrupted parameters. We probe the vulnerability of network parameters in terms of two natural
structural characteristics of deep neural networks: the type, e.g., whether they belong to embeddings
or convolutions, and the position, e.g., whether they belong to lower layers or higher layers. Due to
limited space, the results of different layers in neural networks corrupted with multiple  and detailed
visualization of the vulnerability of different components are shown in Appendix.
Vulnerability in Terms of Parameter Types Figure 4 (a-b) show the distinguished vulnerability of
different selected components in ResNet-34 and Transformer. Several observations can be drawn from
the results: (1) Normalization layers are prone to parameter corruption. The batch normalization
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Table 1: Comparisons of gradient-based corruption and random corruption under the corruption
constraint, with further study on the number n of parameters to be corrupted. Here, all parameters
can be corrupted, that is, k stands for the total number of model parameters and n = k means the
number of changed parameters is not limited. ↑ means the higher value the better accuracy and ↓
means the opposite. ? denotes original scores without parameter corruption and scores close to the
original score (difference less than 0.1).
Dataset ImageNet (Acc ↑) CIFAR-10 (Acc ↑) PTB-LM (Log PPL ↓) PTB-Parsing (UAS ↑) De-En (BLEU ↑)
Base model ResNet-34 LSTM MLP Transformer
w/o corruption 72.5 ? 94.3 ? 4.25 ? 87.3 ? 35.33 ?
Approach Random Proposed Random Proposed Random Proposed Random Proposed Random Proposed
n=k, =10-4 ? 62.2 (-10.3) ? 93.3 (-1.0) ? ? ? ? ? 35.21 (-0.12)
n=k, =10-3 ? 22.2 (-50.3) ? 36.1 (-58.2) ? ? ? 80.6 (-6.7) ? 33.62 (-1.71)
n=k, =10-2 30.3 (-42.2) 0.1 (-72.4) 75.1 (-19.2) 10.0 (-84.3) ? 4.52 (+0.27) 79.8 (-7.5) 6.1 (-81.2) 34.82 (-0.51) 0.17 (-35.16)
n=k, =10-1 0.1 (-72.4) 0.1 (-72.4) 10.0 (-84.3) 10.0 (-84.3) 4.43 (+0.18) 13.25 (+9.00) 0.0 (-87.3) 0.0 (-87.3) 0.00 (-35.33) 0.00 (-35.33)
n=k, =1 0.1 (-72.4) 0.1 (-72.4) 10.0 (-84.3) 10.0 (-84.3) 32.21 (+27.96) 48.92 (+44.67) 0.0 (-87.3) 0.0 (-87.3) 0.00 (-35.33) 0.00 (-35.33)
n=100, =10-2 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 64.6 (-22.7) ? ?
n=100, =10-1 ? 67.5 (-5.0) ? ? ? ? ? 11.0 (-76.3) ? 31.68 (-3.65)
n=100, =1 ? 0.1 (-72.4) ? ? ? ? 87.1 (-0.2) 0.0 (-87.3) 35.25 (-0.08) 0.00 (-35.33)
n=100, =101 0.2 (-72.3) 0.1 (-72.4) 77.1 (-17.2) 44.8 (-49.5) ? ? 31.9 (-55.4) 0.0 (-87.3) 11.58 (-23.75) 0.00 (-35.33)
n=100, =102 0.1 (-72.4) 0.1 (-72.4) 10.1 (-84.2) 9.6 (-84.7) 16.90 (+12.65) 23.55 (+19.30) 0.0 (-87.3) 0.0 (-87.3) 0.00 (-35.33) 0.00 (-35.33)
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Figure 3: Results of gradient-based corruption and random corruption under the corruption constraints
(n = k). Results of ResNet-34 are from CIFAR-10. We can conclude that the gradient-based
corruption performs more effectively than the random corruption on all the tasks.
in ResNet-34 and the layer normalization in Transformer are most sensitive in comparison to other
components in each network. It is possible that since these components adjust the data distribution,
a slight change in scaling or biasing could lead to systematic disorder in the whole network. (2)
Convolution layers are more sensitive to corruption than fully-connected layers. Since parameters
in convolution, i.e., the filters, are repeatedly applied to the input feature grids, they might exert
more influence than parameters in fully-connected layers that are only applied to the inputs once. (3)
Embedding and attention layers are relatively robust against parameter corruption. It is obvious that
embeddings consist of word vectors and fewer word vectors are corrupted if the corrupted number of
parameters is limited, thus scarcely affecting the model. The robustness of attention is intriguing and
further experimentation is required to understand its characteristics.
Vulnerability in Terms of Parameter Positions The illustration of division of different layers and
results of parameter corruption on different layers are shown in Figure 4 (c-f). We can draw the
following observations: (1) Lower layers in ResNet-34 are less robust to parameter corruption. It is
generally believed that lower layers in convolutional neural networks extract basic visual patterns and
are very fundamental in classification tasks [37], which indicates that perturbations to lower layers
can fundamentally hurt the whole neural network. (2) Upper layers in Transformer Decoder are
less robust to parameter corruption. From the sequence-to-sequence perspective, the encoder layers
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Figure 4: Results of gradient-based corruption on (a-b) different components of ResNet-34 (ImageNet)
and Transformer under the corruption constraint (p = +∞, n = 10) and (c-f) different layers in
ResNet-34 and Transformer (p = +∞, n = 100). Conv: convolution; Emb: embedding; FC:
fully-connected; Attn: attention; BN: batch normalization; LN: layer normalization.  is set to be 10
and 0.2 for ResNet-34 and Transformer, respectively. Warmer colors indicate significant accuracy
degradation (compared to scores without parameter corruption in Table 1).
encode the sequence from shallow semantics to deep semantics and the decoder layers decode the
sequence in a reversed order. It means that the higher layers are responsible for the choice of specific
words and have a direct impact on the generated sequence. For Transformer Encoder, the parameter
corruption exhibits inconspicuous trends.
As we can see, the proposed indicator reveals several problems that are rarely paid attention to
before. Especially, the results on normalization layers should provide experimental verification for
the heuristic designs of future architecture.
3.4 Improving Accuracy via Adversarial Corruption-Resistant Training
As shown by the probing results, the indicator can reveal interesting vulnerability of neural networks,
which leads to poor robustness against parameter corruption. An important question is what we could
do about the discovered vulnerability in practice, since it could be the innate characteristic of the
neural network components and cannot be eliminated in design. However, if we can automatically
drive the parameters from the area with steep surroundings measured by the indicator, we can obtain
models that achieve natural balance on accuracy and parameter robustness.
To this end, we propose to counteract the parameter corruption in an adversarial way. The key idea is
to routinely corrupt the parameters and minimize both the induced loss change and the original loss.
Intuitively, the corruption-resistant training tries to keep the parameters away from the neighborhood
where there are sheer directions around, which means the parameters should be situated at the center
of a flattish basin in the loss landscape.
Concretely, given batched data B, virtual gradient-based corruption aˆ on parameter w, let’s consider
a new loss L′ that minimizes both the loss with corrupted parameter w + aˆ and the initial loss:
L′(w;B) = (1− λ1)L(w;B) + λ1L(w + aˆ;B) ≈ L(w;B) + λ1f(aˆ). (9)
Denote λ1f(aˆ) asR(w;B), which can be seen as a regularization term in the proposed adversarial
corruption-resistant training. We can see that it actually serves as gradient regularization by simple
derivation. Define λ = λ1. According to Eq. (7) , when S = {‖a‖p = }, the regularization term is
R(w;B) = λ1‖g‖p/(p−1) = λ‖g‖p/(p−1).
Experimental Results We conduct experiments on CIFAR-10 and PTB-Parsing to validate that the
proposed corruption-resistant training functions as designed. In experiments, we use p = 2 for CIFAR-
10 and PTB-Parsing. In Table 2, we can see that incorporating a virtual gradient-based corruption
into adversarial anti-corruption training can help improve both the accuracy of the uncorrupted model
and the robustness of neural networks against parameter corruption. In particular, by comparing the
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Figure 5: Results of corruption-resistant training
with different  or λ.
Table 2: Results of the proposed corruption-
resistant training, which not only improves the
accuracy without corruption but also enhances
the robustness against corruption.
PTB-Parsing (UAS ↑) CIFAR-10 (Acc ↑)
L/UAS Baseline Proposed L/Acc Baseline Proposed
UAS 87.26 87.92 (+0.66) Acc 94.26 96.12 (+1.86)
L 0.0807 0.0813 L 0.0197 0.0203
=0.02 80.82 86.37 =0.05 93.20 95.65
=0.05 72.04 80.75 =0.1 89.84 94.59
=0.1 57.42 71.70 =0.2 71.44 87.92
=0.2 37.94 55.40 =0.5 13.77 21.42
=0.5 0.00 2.70 =1 10.00 10.94
loss, we can see that parameters that are resistant to corruption, albeit having higher training loss,
may entail better generalization, reflected as higher accuracy in testing. In Figure 5, we show the
influence of hyper-parameter λ to the accuracy. Based on the results, the accuracy of the uncorrupted
neural network can often be improved substantially with small λ. In particular, the accuracy can be
treated as a unimodal function of λ approximately, whose best configuration can be determined easily,
showing general effectiveness of the proposed training approach.
4 Related Work
Vulnerability of DNNs Existing studies concerning vulnerability or robustness of neural networks
mostly focus on generating adversarial examples [14] and adversarial training algorithms given
adversarial examples in the input data [38]. [31] first proposed the concept of adversarial examples
and found that neural network classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial attacks on input data. Following
that study, different adversarial attack algorithms [26, 18] were developed. Another class of studies [7,
6, 15, 19] known as backdoor attacks injected vulnerabilities to neural networks by data poisoning,
which requires access to the training process of the neural network models.
Adversarial Training Other related work on adversarial examples aimed to design adversarial
defense algorithms to evaluate and improve the robustness of neural networks over adversarial
examples [3, 21, 38]. As another application of adversarial training, GAN [13] has been widely
used in multiple machine learning tasks, such as computer vision [10, 20, 33], natural language
processing [12, 36, 8] and time series synthesis [9, 11]. It consists of a generator and a discriminator,
where the generator aims to generate adversarial examples against the discriminator to generate
synthetic and new instances of data.
To summarize, existing related work mostly focuses on adversarial examples and its adversarial
training. However, we focus on parameter corruptions of neural networks so as to find vulnerable
components of models and design an adversarial corruption-resistant training algorithm to improve
the parameter robustness.
5 Conclusions
To better understand the vulnerability of DNN parameters, which is not well studied before, we
propose an indicator measuring the maximum loss change when a small perturbation is applied to
model parameters to evaluate the robustness against parameter corruption. Intuitively, the indicator
describes the steepness of the loss surface around the parameters. We show that the indicator can be
efficiently estimated by a gradient-based method and random parameter corruptions can hardly induce
the maximum degradation, which is validated both theoretically and empirically. In addition, we apply
the proposed indicator to systematically analyze the vulnerability of different parameters in different
neural networks and reveal that the normalization layers, which are important in stabilizing the data
distribution in deep neural networks, are prone to parameter corruption. Furthermore, we propose an
adversarial learning approach to improve the parameter robustness and show that parameters that are
resistant to parameter corruption embody better robustness and accuracy.
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A Appendix
A.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Random Corruption
In this section, we discuss the characteristics of the loss change caused by random corruption
under a representative corruption constraint in Theorem 1. Here we choose the constraint set
S = {a : ‖a‖2 = } and show that it is not generally possible for the random corruption to
cause substantial loss changes in this circumstance both theoretically and experimentally, making it
ineffective in finding vulnerability.
In Theorem 1, the detailed definitions of the gamma function, beta function and hyper-geometric
function are as follows: Γ(·) and B(·, ·) denote the gamma function and beta function, and F1(·, ·; ·; ·)
denotes the Gaussian or ordinary hyper-geometric function, which can also be written as 2F1(·, ·; ·; ·):
Γ(z) =
∫ +∞
0
tz−1e−tdt, B(p, q) =
∫ 1
0
tp−1(1− t)q−1dt, (10)
F1(a, b; c; z) = 1 +
+∞∑
n=1
a(a+ 1) · · · (a+ n− 1)× b(b+ 1) · · · (b+ n− 1)
c(c+ 1) · · · (c+ n− 1)
zn
n!
. (11)
Theorem 1 states that the expectation of loss change of random corruption is infinitesimal compared
to ∆maxL(w, S,D) when  → 0. In addition, it is unlikely for multiple random trials to induce
the optimal loss change corresponding to the indicator. For a deep neural network, the number of
parameters, which is the upper bound of k, can be considerably large. According to Eq.(6), η will
be concentrated near 0. Thus, theoretically, it is not generally possible for the random corruption to
cause substantial loss changes in this circumstance, making it ineffective in finding vulnerability.
The conclusion is also empirically validated. In particular, we define α(p) as a real number in
[0, 1] satisfying P (|∆L(w, a˜,D)| < α(p)) = p, which means |∆L(w, a˜,D)| < α(p) keeps with a
probability p. We then compare the gradient-based corruption and 10,000 random corruptions on
a language model and  is set to 5 × 10−4. The distribution of the results of the 10, 000 random
corruptions are reported in Table 3, as well as the gradient-based corruption result. We can find
that the gradient-based corruption can cause a loss change G of 0.044, while the loss change of
the random corruption |∆L(w, a˜,D)| is less than 10−4 with a high probability, which shows a huge
difference of more than 400 times (η < 1/400) in terms of the corrupting effectiveness.
Table 3: Probability distribution of corruption effects |∆L(w, a˜,D)| for random corruption. α(p)
satisfies P (|∆L(w, a˜,D)| < α(p)) = p. Random corruption has small loss changes with high
probability while gradient-based gradient-based corruption results in a loss change 400 times larger.
Approach α(0.9) α(0.95) α(0.995)
Random corruption (Empirical) 4.0× 10−5 4.8× 10−5 7.0× 10−5
Random corruption (Theoretical) 1.5× 10−5 1.8× 10−5 2.5× 10−5
gradient-based gradient-based corruption ∆maxL(w, S,D) ≈ G = 0.044
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A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. According to Definition 3,
a˜ = arg max
‖a‖2=
aTr = 
r
‖r‖2 (12)
where r ∼ N(0, 1) (1 ≤ i ≤ k). Note that r obeys the Gaussian distribution with a mean vector of
zero and a covariance matrix of I . Thus, the distribution of r has rotational invariance and a˜ =  r‖r‖2
also has rotational invariance. Therefore, a˜ obeys a uniform distribution on ‖a˜‖2 = .
First, we proof Eq.(5).
∆L(w,a;D) = aTg + 1
2
aTHa + o(2) = f(a) + o(), max
‖a‖2=
f(a) = max
‖a‖2=
aT = G (13)
Therefore,
∆maxL(w, S,D) = G+ o() (14)
Suppose a˜ = (a1, a2, · · · , ak−1, ak)T,g = (g1, g2, · · · , gk−1, gk)T and Hij = ∂2L(w+a;D)/∂ai∂aj .
Since a˜ obeys a uniform distribution on ‖a˜‖2 = , by symmetry, we have,
E‖a˜‖2=[ai] = E‖a˜‖2=[aiaj ] = 0 (i 6= j) (15)
E‖a˜‖2=[a
2
i ] = E‖a˜‖2=[
‖a‖2
k
] =
2
k
(16)
Therefore,
E‖a˜‖2=[∆L(w, a˜,D)] = E‖a˜‖2=[a˜Tg +
1
2
a˜THa˜ + o(2)] (17)
= E‖a˜‖2=[a˜
Tg] + E‖a˜‖2=[
1
2
a˜THa˜] + o(2) (18)
= E‖a˜‖2=[
∑
i
giai] + E‖a˜‖2=[
1
2
∑
i,j
Hijaiaj ] + o(
2) (19)
=
∑
i
Hii
2
2k
+ o(2) (20)
= O(
tr(H)
k
2) (21)
Then, we proof Eq.(6). Because of the rotational invariance of the distribution of a˜, we may assume
g
‖g‖2 = (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0)T, a˜ = (a1, a2, a3, · · · , ak−1, ak)T and
a1 =  cosφ1
a2 =  sinφ1 cosφ2
a3 =  sinφ1 sinφ2 cosφ3
· · ·
ak−1 =  sinφ1 sinφ2 · · · sinφk−2 cosφk−1
ak =  sinφ1 sinφ2 · · · sinφk−2 sinφk−1
(22)
where φi ∈ [0, pi] (i 6= k − 1) and φk−1 ∈ [0, 2pi). For x ∈ [0, 1], define α = arccosx, then:
f(a˜) = a˜Tg = G cosφ1, P (η ≤ x) = P (| cosφ1| ≤ x) = 2P (0 ≤ φ1 ≤ α) (23)
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That is to say,
P (η ≤ x) = 2
∫ 2pi
0
∫ pi
0
· · · ∫ α
0
(sink−2 φ1 sink−3 φ2 · · · sinφk−2)dφ1 · · · dφk−2dφk−1∫ 2pi
0
∫ pi
0
· · · ∫ pi
0
(sink−2 φ1 sink−3 φ2 · · · sinφk−2)dφ1 · · · dφk−2dφk−1
(24)
=
2
∫ α
0
sink−2 φ1dφ1∫ pi
0
sink−2 φ1dφ1
=
∫ α
0
sink−2 φ1dφ1∫ pi
2
0
sink−2 φ1dφ1
=
2
∫ α
0
sink−2 φ1dφ1
B(k−12 ,
1
2 )
(25)
=
2 cosαF1(
1
2 ,
3−k
2 ;
3
2 ; cos
2 α)
B(k−12 ,
1
2 )
=
2xF1(
1
2 ,
3−k
2 ;
3
2 ;x
2)
B(k−12 ,
1
2 )
(26)
and notice that
sinα = (1− x2) 12 , ∣∣dα
dx
∣∣ = 1
(1− x2) 12 , B(p, q) =
Γ(p)Γ(q)
Γ(p+ q)
,Γ(
1
2
) =
√
pi (27)
then according to Eq.(25):
pη(x) =
2 sink−2 α
B(k−12 ,
1
2 )
∣∣dα
dx
∣∣ = 2Γ(k2 )√
piΓ(k−12 )
(1− x2) k−32 (28)
A.2.2 Closed-Form Solutions in Definitions
The close-form solutions of the random parameter corruption in Definition 3 and gradient-based
corruption in Definition 4 can be generalized into Proposition 1, which is the maximum of linear
function under the corruption constraint.
Proposition 1 (Constrained Maximum). Given a vector v ∈ Rk, the optimal aˆ that maximizes aTv
under the corruption constraint a ∈ S = {a : ‖a‖p =  and ‖a‖0 ≤ n} is
aˆ = arg max
a∈S
aTv = (sgn(h) |h|
1
p−1
‖|h| 1p−1 ‖p
), and aˆTv = ‖h‖ p
p−1
, (29)
where h = topn(v), retaining top-n magnitude of all |v| dimensions and set other dimensions to 0,
sgn(·) denotes the signum function, | · | denotes the point-wise absolute function, and (·)α denotes
the point-wise α-power function.
Proof. When a ∈ S = {a : ‖a‖p =  and ‖a‖0 ≤ n}, define a = Pb, where P is a diagonal 0/1
matrix with n ones. It is easy to verify P T = P = P 2. Define q = pp−1 ,
1
p +
1
q = 1 here. Then
according to Holder Inequality, for 1p +
1
q = 1, (1 ≤ p, q ≤ +∞),
aTv = bTPv = bTPPv = aT(Pv) ≤ ‖a‖p‖Pv‖q = ‖h‖ p
p−1
(30)
where h = Mv = topn(v), M is a diagonal 0/1 matrix and Mj,j = 1 if and only if |v|j is in the
top-n magnitude of all |v| dimensions. The equation holds if and only if,
aˆ = (sgn(h) |h|
1
p−1
‖|h| 1p−1 ‖p
) (31)
and the maximum value of aTv is aˆTv = ‖h‖ p
p−1
.
Proposition 1 indicates that the maximization of the value aTv under the corruption constraint has a
closed-form solution. The solutions to a special case, where p = +∞ are shown below.
Corollary 1. When p = +∞, the solution in Proposition 1 is,
aˆ = lim
p→+∞ (sgn(h)
|h| 1p−1
‖|h| 1p−1 ‖p
) = sgn(h), and aˆTv = ‖h‖1 (32)
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Proof. In Proposition 1, when p → +∞, 0 1p−1 → 0, x 1p−1 → 1 (x 6= 0) and |h| 1p−1 → I(h 6= 0).
Then
aˆ = lim
p→+∞ (sgn(h)
|h| 1p−1
‖|h| 1p−1 ‖p
) = sgn(h) (33)
and the maximum value of aTv is aˆTv = ‖h‖ p
p−1
= ‖h‖1.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Define q = pp−1 ,
1
p +
1
q = 1 here.
We introduce a lemma first.
Lemma A.1. For vector x ∈ Rk, ‖x‖0 ≤ n ≤ k, for any r > 1, ‖x‖2 ≤ βr‖x‖r, where
βr = max{1, n1/2−1/r}.
Proof of Lemma A.1. We may assume x = (x1, x2, · · · , xk)T and xn+1 = xn+2 = · · · = xk = 0.
Then ‖x‖r =
( n∑
i=1
|xi|r
) 1
r .
When 1 < r < 2, define t = r2 < 1 and h(x) = x
t+(1−x)t, h′′(x) = t(t−1)(xt−2+(1−x)t−2) <
0, thus h(x) ≥ max{h(0), h(1)} = 1 (x ∈ [0, 1]).
Then for a, b ≥ 0 and a+ b > 0, we have at+bt(a+b)t = ( aa+b )t + (1− aa+b )t = h( aa+b ) ≥ 1. That is to
say, at + bt ≥ (a+ b)t. More generally, at + bt + · · ·+ ct ≥ (a+ b+ · · ·+ c)t. Therefore,
‖x‖r =
( n∑
i=1
|xi|r
) 1
r =
( n∑
i=1
(|xi|2) r2
) 1
r ≥ (( n∑
i=1
|xi|2) r2
) 1
r = ‖x‖2 (34)
When r ≥ 2, according to the power mean inequality,
‖x‖r =
( n∑
i=1
|xi|r
) 1
r = n
1
r
( n∑i=1 |xi|r
n
) 1
r ≥ n 1r (
n∑
i=1
|xi|2
n
) 1
2 = n
1
r− 12 (
n∑
i=1
|xi|2) 12 = n 1r− 12 ‖x‖2
(35)
To conclude, ‖x‖2 ≤ βr‖x‖r, where βr = max{1, n1/2−1/r}.
According to Lemma A.1, notice that ‖a∗‖0 ≤ n, define h = topn(g), then ‖h‖2 ≥ nk ‖g‖2 we have,
‖a∗‖2 ≤ βp‖a∗‖p ≤ βp, ‖h‖q ≥ ‖h‖2
βq
≥ ‖g‖2
βq
√
n
k
=
G
βq
√
n
k
(36)
Since L(w;D) is convex and L-smooth in w + S,
∆L(w, aˆ,D)) ≥ gTaˆ = ‖h‖q (37)
∆L(w,a∗,D) ≤ gTa∗ + L
2
‖a∗‖22 = ‖h‖q +
L
2
‖a∗‖22 (38)
Therefore,
Left Hand Side =
∆L(w,a∗,D)
∆L(w, aˆ,D) ≤
‖h‖q + L2 ‖a∗‖22
‖h‖q ≤ 1 +
Lβ2p
2‖h‖q ≤ 1 +
Lβ2pβq
√
k
2G
√
n
(39)
When p ≥ 2, q ≤ 2, β2pβq = n1−2/p, and when p ≤ 2, q ≥ 2, β2pβq = n1/2−1/q = n1/p−1/2. To
conclude, β2pβq = max{n1−2/p, n1/p−1/2} = nmax{1−2/p,1/p−1/2}, therefore,
Left Hand Side ≤ 1 + Ln
max{1−2/p,1/p−1/2}√k
2G
√
n
 = 1 +O
(
Lnmax{1/2−2/p,1/p−1}
√
k
G
)
(40)
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A.3 Computational Complexity of Parameter Corruption
For the parameter corruption, the closed-form solution is determined by (1) the set of allowed
corruptions S, i.e., n, k,  and p; and (2) the vector v, corresponding to r in random corruption and g
in gradient-based corruption. The first condition has a computational cost of O(k log n), because a
top-n check is involved, which is at least O(k log n), and other calculations, such as multiplication
and inversion, are less than O(k).
For the second condition, sampling r should be trivial on modern computers but obtaining g with
respect to the whole dataset can be costly, generally of cost O(k|D|).
A.4 Model Implementation
This section shows the implementation details of neural networks used in our experiments. Experi-
ments are conducted on a GeForce GTX TITAN X GPU.
A.4.1 ResNet
We adopt Resnet-34 [16] as a baseline on two benchmark datasets: CIFAR-10 [32] and ImageNet [29].
CIFAR-103 is an image classification dataset with 10 categories and consists of 50000 training images
and 10000 test images. The images are of 32-by-32 pixel size with 3 channels. We adopt the
classification accuracy as our evaluation metric on CIFAR-10. For ImageNet4, it contains 10M
labeled images of more than 10k categories as the training dataset and 50k images as the validation
dataset. Note that the gradient-based parameter corruption on ResNet on ImageNet uses gradients
from the validation set due to the sheer size of ImageNet, while other experiments use gradients
from the training set. We adopt the Top-1 and Top-5 accuracy (Acc) on the validation dataset as
our evaluation metrics on ImageNet. We adopt SGD as the optimizer with the mini-batch size of
128. The learning rate is 0.1; the momentum is 0.9; and the weight-decay is 5 × 10−4. We also
apply data augmentation for training following [16]: 4 pixels are padded on each side, and a 32*32
crop is randomly sampled from the padded image or its horizontal flip. In adversarial corruption-
resistant training, we find that directly optimizing the new loss L′ in Eq. 9 instead of optimizing the
regularization term can further improve the accuracy. Therefore we optimize L′ directly and choose
λ1 = 0.5. Here λ ≈ λ1 = /2, we report the hyper-parameter  instead of λ in paper.
A.4.2 Transformer
We implement the “transformer iwslt de en” provided by fairseq [27] on German-English translation
dataset. We use the same dataset splits following [27, 28, 35]. The dataset and the implementation
of “transformer iwslt de en” can be found at the fairseq repository5. The dataset contains 153K
sentences for training, 7K sentences for validation, and 7K sentences for testing. BPE is used to
get vocabularies. We adopt BLEU score as the evaluation metric on the translation task. We use
the shared embedding settings and adopt a vocabulary size of 10,149. The dropout rate is 0.3, the
attention dropout rate is 0.1 and the activation dropout rate is 0.1. The training batch size is 4, 096
tokens and we update the model for every 2 steps. We adopt a learning rate schedule with an initial
learning rate of 10−7 and a base learning rate of 0.0015. The number of warmup steps is 8000. We
set the test beam-size to 5. We adopt the checkpoint-average mechanism for evaluation and the last
10 checkpoints are averaged.
A.4.3 LSTM
We use a 3-layer LSTM as a language model following [23, 24] on the word-level Penn TreeBank
dataset (PTB)6[22]. The dataset has been preprocessed and the vocabulary size is limited to 10000
words. We adopt the log perplexity on the test set as the evaluation metric on PTB. We use the Adam
optimizer and initialize the learning rate with 0.001. The embedding size is set to 400 and the hidden
size is set to 1150. We use the weight-decay of 1.2 ∗ 10−6.
3CIFAR-10 can be found at https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/cifar.html
4ImageNet can be found at http://www.image-net.org
5https://github.com/pytorch/fairseq
6PTB can be found at https://www.kaggle.com/nltkdata/penn-tree-bank?select=ptb
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Figure 6: Results of gradient-based gradient-based corruption on different layers in ResNet-34 and
Transformer (p = +∞, n = 100). Warmer colors indicate significant performance degradation. For
example, “red” means the most significant performance degradation while “blue” means the opposite.
Results show that different neural networks exhibit diverse characteristics. Particularly, lower layers
in ResNet-34 are more robust to parameter corruption while Transformer decoder shows the opposite
trend.
A.4.4 MLP
We implement a MLP-based parser following [5] on a transition-based dependency parsing dataset
provided by the English Penn TreeBank (PTB)[22]. We follow the standard splits of the dataset and
adopt Unlabeled Attachment Score (UAS) as the evaluation metric. The hidden size is set to 512
and the batch size is 1, 024. We use the Adam optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.001. We
evaluate the model on the development set every epoch and find the best checkpoint to evaluate the
test results. The dropout rate is 0.2.
A.5 Supplement Experimental Results
In this section, we report supplement experimental results of our proposed parameter corruption
approach to analyze and visualize the weak points of selected deep neural networks, which illustrates
the divergent vulnerability of different components within a neural network.
A.5.1 Vulnerability in Terms of Parameter Positions
In our paper, we visualize the influence of parameter positions on the vulnerability of deep neural
networks by applying the gradient-based gradient-based corruption consecutively to layers in ResNet-
34 and Transformer. Several observations can be drawn from our paper: 1) Lower layers in ResNet-34
are less robust to parameter corruption and are prone to cause overall damage; 2) Upper layers in
Transformer decoder are less robust to parameter corruption while the parameter corruption exhibits
inconspicuous trend for Transformer Encoder.
In this section, we report some experimental results in Figure 6, Table 4 and Table 5 as the supplement
experimental results for our work.
A.5.2 Choice of Hyper-parameters in Adversarial Training
For CIFAR-10 dataset, we choose  ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1}, and for PTB-Parsing dataset, we
choose λ ∈ {0.001, 0.002, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02}. The results are shown in Table 6. In our paper, we
choose the hyper-parameters with best performance. Therefore, for CIFAR-10,  = 0.5, and for
PTB-Parsing, λ = 0.01.
A.5.3 Detailed Visualization of the Vulnerability of Different Components in ResNet-34
In our paper, ResNet-34 is roughly divided into four layers. In this section, we report detailed
visualization of the vulnerability of different components in ResNet-34 as shown in Figure 7. We can
see that 1) Lower layers in ResNet-34 are more robust to parameter corruption; 2) Batch normalization
in ResNet-34 is usually less robust to parameter corruption compared to its neighborhood components.
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Table 4: Results of corrupting different layers (p = 2, n = 100) of ResNet-34 on ImageNet and
CIFAR-10. ? denotes original performance scores without parameter corruption and scores close to
the original score (difference less than 0.1).
Dataset layer1 layer2 layer3 layer4
CIFAR-10
w/o Corruption 94.3 ?
 = 10 ? ? ? ?
 = 20 93.6 ? 87.6 ?
 = 50 62.2 29.6 31.9 ?
 = 100 13.5 13.2 11.8 92.5
 = 200 10.0 10.1 10.3 71.4
 = 500 10.0 10.9 9.8 30.7
ImageNet
w/o Corruption 72.5 ?
 = 0.1 72.2 ? 72.2 ?
 = 0.2 71.7 72.1 71.7 ?
 = 0.5 71.0 70.5 69.9 71.3
 = 1 66.5 68.5 67.9 69.3
 = 2 51.6 56.9 63.0 64.2
 = 5 2.5 1.4 1.4 27.2
 = 10 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Table 5: Results of corrupting different layers (n = 100, L2-norm) of Transformer on De-En. ?
denotes original performance scores without parameter attack and scores close to the original score
(difference less than 0.1).
layer1 layer2 layer3 layer4 layer5 layer6
w/o Corruption 35.33 ?
Encoder
 = 0.1 ? ? ? ? ? ?
 = 0.2 ? ? ? ? ? 34.88
 = 0.5 ? ? 29.89 35.06 ? 32.06
 = 1 ? ? 9.68 33.54 35.04 1.76
 = 2 ? 27.23 0.53 2.79 32.85 0.05
 = 5 33.21 0.44 0.07 0.16 9.28 0
 = 10 5.8 0 0.05 0.11 0.55 0
 = 20 0.24 0 0.08 0.17 0.32 0
 = 50 0.04 0 0.11 0.17 0.33 0
Decoder
 = 0.1 ? ? ? ? ? 35.01
 = 0.2 ? ? ? ? ? 34.40
 = 0.5 35.17 34.97 ? 35.21 35.07 31.02
 = 1 34.99 34.71 35.17 34.53 34.37 21.90
 = 2 33.86 33.08 32.09 31.00 32.00 1.97
 = 5 7.96 0.11 0.86 1.72 3.18 0.02
Table 6: Results of different hyper-parameters in adversarial training.
CIFAR-10 PTB-Parsing
 ∆ Acc ↑ λ ∆ UAS ↑
0.05 +1.5 0.001 -0.2
0.1 +1.8 0.002 +0.1
0.2 +1.9 0.005 +0.3
0.5 +1.9 0.01 +0.6
1 +1.0 0.02 -0.1
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(a) ResNet-34 (ImageNet).
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(b) ResNet-34 (CIFAR-10).
Figure 7: Detailed visualization of the vulnerability of different components in ResNet-34 and
Transformer (p = +∞, n = 100).  is set to 0.5 for ResNet-34 (ImageNet) and 5 for ResNet-34
(CIFAR-10). Warmer colors indicate significant performance degradation. We can see that 1) Lower
layers in ResNet-34 are more robust to parameter corruption; 2) Batch normalization in ResNet-34
are usually less robust to parameter corruption compared to its neighborhood components.
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